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Abstract. Romania completed its negotiations for accession to the European Union, 
as scheduled, by the end of 2004. The experience of the negotiations over the 2004 
enlargement confirmed that the EU budget is an absolutely key issue in such talks. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the context of Romania’s negotiations over 
the EU Budget. First, we look at the relationship the EU15 member states have with 
the EU budget. We show how rules governing the operation of the EU Budget have 
affected budgetary flows to the EU15 and highlight the stability over time of the 
shares of total budget flows to and from each member state. Second, we look at the 
experience of the new Member States in their accession negotiations and review the 
outcomes. This will allow us to see how the political economy of the EU Budget 
affected the talks and the deal the new member states were able to secure. We then 
apply the lessons learned to the case of Romania. Our analysis reveals inflexibilities 




2004 was a momentous year for the European Union. Ten countries from 
central, eastern and southern Europe joined on 1 May and, on schedule, Romania and 
Bulgaria completed their negotiations for accession in 2007, albeit with certain 
conditions still to be met for 2007 entry. In this paper we focus on the one area of 
discussion that, despite not being the subject of any of the 31 negotiating chapters, 
was absolutely crucial to the successful conclusion of the talks – the magnitude (and, 
by implication, the distribution) of the financial flows between the EU Budget and the 
member states. The EU budget has, for many years, had a political significance far in 
excess of its modest economic size. It was therefore not surprising that the talks over 
money should prove acrimonious. 
This paper has two goals. First, we analyse the relationship between the EU15 
and the EU Budget, along with the experience in the accession negotiations of the 
New Member States (NMS), to provide context to Romania’s financial agreement. 
Second, we place this discussion within the context of the politics and rules under 
which the EU Budget operates. These serve to emphasise the constraints, economic 
and political, within which all applicant states have had to negotiate their future 
budgetary relations with the EU15. 
                                                        
* Robert Ackrill, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Economics at Nottingham Trent University, UK. He has 
published widely in the areas of the EU Budget, the CAP and EU enlargement. 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in May 2004 to “Symposium 37” at the University of 
the West, Timişoara and to the European Institute of Romania, Bucureşti. It also draws on related work 
presented to “Constructing World Orders”, SGIR 5th Pan-European Conference, The Hague, in 
September 2004. The author thanks participants for helpful comments. Whilst the title of this paper 
looks remarkably similar to Mayhew 2003b, published in this Journal, this paper has been designed, as 
far as possible, to present ideas complementary to Mayhew’s, focusing on EU budgetary processes. 
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The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 sets out the key features of the EU 
Budget. Section 3 considers the consequences of the EU Budget process for the 
distribution of transfers amongst the EU15 member states. Section 4 uses this as the 
basis for explaining the shape of the budgetary agreement for the 2004 enlargement. 
In Section 5 we draw this together to offer an insight into the budget agreement for 
Romania. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE EU BUDGET – FEATURES AND PROCESSES 
 
The EU Budget is the means by which the EU funds most of its activities.2 We 
begin by noting some of its main features (see, inter alia, Ackrill, 2000; Laffan, 2000 
for more details). First, it is extremely small. Annual spending is limited to about 1% 
of EU Gross National Income (GNI)3, whereas EU member states’ national budgets 
currently range from about 35% of GDP to about 60% (Romania sits at the lower end 
of this range). Second, the EU Budget is subject to an annual balanced budget rule. 
The EU sets a limit on revenues, then agrees spending each year to respect this limit. 
Revenue (or ‘Own Resources’) for the EU Budget comes from four principal 
sources. ‘Traditional’ own resources are made up of the import tariffs associated with 
the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Commercial Policy. These 
represent about 12% of total revenues (2002 figures). Most money is raised through 
revenues related to VAT (29% of the total in 2002) and GNI (59%). Thus a member 
state’s total contributions to the EU Budget are broadly in proportion to the relative 
size of its economy. There is, however, a limit on the VAT contribution to ensure 
poor countries, with a higher share of Consumption in National Income, do not pay 
excessive sums under this own resource. 
On the expenditure side there are many policies that attract EU spending, but 
the largest two by far, taking over 80% of total spending each year, are the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural/Regional Policies. Thus, in terms of each 
country’s net contribution to/from the EU Budget, broadly speaking ‘size matters’ for 
payments to the EU Budget, whereas economic structure (the size of the agricultural 
sector and level of economic development) are dominant in determining a member 
state’s receipts from the Budget. 
 
Before we look at the EU’s budgetary processes, we need to explain one more 
feature of the EU Budget, the distinction between Compulsory Expenditures (CE) and 
Non-Compulsory Expenditures (NCE). CE are those expenditures for which an 
explicit commitment is made in the Treaty of Rome. CE is dominated by CAP 
income-support (‘Guarantee’) spending. The largest component of NCE is Regional 
Policy spending. A key feature of CE is that once the expenditure-generating policies 
are in place, the EU is committed to fulfilling all resulting claims on the budget. NCE, 
however, is more or less the exact reverse – total spending is agreed, then funds are 
allocated between competing claims. Thus total NCE is fixed in advance whilst the 
burden of CE is potentially open-ended. 
The CE/NCE distinction is particularly important for the relative powers of the 
European institutions. The European Parliament has steadily gained more control over 
                                                        
2 The EU is involved in other financial activities, for example borrowing through the European 
Investment Bank, but these lie outside the framework of the EU Budget and so are not considered here. 
3 It is common to refer to a figure of 1.24% of GNI (previously 1.27% of GNP). This is misleading, as 
it includes sums intended for spending in future years on multi-annual projects. 
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the execution of the EU Budget – and it has the greater say over NCE – but the Treaty 
of Rome has limited the annual growth rate of NCE. With CE – and CAP spending in 
particular – their powers are much less. The only way to influence CAP spending is to 
change the expenditure-inducing legislation (that is, to reform the CAP). Co-decision 
has not been extended to CAP market support policies and so the balance of power 
over the CAP and its spending remains firmly with the member states through the 
Council of Ministers. That said, the 1992 reform of the CAP had a profound impact 
on the evolution of CAP spending. To see why, consider the principal forms of CAP 
support and expenditure before and after the 1992 reform. 
Before 1992, the main expenditures were associated with price support, the 
policy of maintaining prices for farm products within the EU at levels higher than 
elsewhere in the world. These high prices encouraged farmers to produce greater 
quantities until, for many products, the EU was producing more than it consumed. 
This drove up two types of spending. Because of the price gap, the EU had to pay 
exporters a subsidy to enable them to sell EU products on the world market. Second, 
because not all surplus production could be exported at once, much of it was initially 
put into store (‘intervention’). Intervention is key to the evolution of budget spending 
on the CAP, because it guaranteed farmers a buyer for their produce, even if they 
could not sell it on the open market – so farmers kept on producing more. The nature 
of CE meant the EU had to meet all resulting costs – they could not stop buying into 
intervention just because costs rose. CAP support therefore drove up production, 
which increased surpluses and pushed up CAP spending. 
The 1992 reform reduced support prices significantly, replacing them with 
direct payments. These payments have a fixed unit value but, crucially, they also have 
eligibility limits built into the legislation. For example, payments to livestock 
producers include a limit on the number of animals each farmer can claim for. For 
arable farmers, the per-hectare payment is derived from a fixed yield figure based, 
unchangingly, on yields during 1986-1990 (1995-1999 for the NMS). There is also a 
limit on the total area that payments can be claimed for. As a result, the total cost of 
direct payments is limited. Such CAP support is still ‘Compulsory’, but by building 
spending constraints into the legislation, significant future growth is likely only when 
new member states join the EU and become eligible for support. 
 
3. BUDGET OUTCOMES FOR THE EU15: AN ANALYSIS OF KEY 
FEATURES 
 
In this section we consider briefly the evolution of the EU Budget as a whole. 
We then analyse member states’ shares of total budgetary flows – in which we 
observe remarkable stability, especially on the revenue side, but even in terms of 
expenditures. Institutional constraints and decision-making rules have contributed to 
this. As the EU Budget has grown and more policies given support, it is worth 
reiterating what has happened to spending on traditional policies like the CAP. 
Although recent reforms have changed the nature of support, the amount spent on the 
CAP has fallen only as a percentage of total EU spending, not in absolute terms. 
Table 1 summarises, for selected years, aggregate EU budgetary transfers. 
Note that not all money passes through the member states. On the revenue side, 
money unspent one year can be carried over to the next4. This amount was unusually 
large in 2001, resulting in the smaller percentage of total revenue in 2002 collected 
                                                        
4 Which is then no longer designated as having come from a particular member state. 
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from the member states. On the expenditure side a number of payments, notably 
assistance to third countries, are made directly to these countries rather than through 
individual member states. 
 
Table 1: The EU Budget – A Summary (selected years), € million* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Own Resources Expenditures 
Year from member states total 2%3 to member states total 5%6 
1976 7710 7993 96 6579 7288 90 
1980 15428 16066 96 14592 16289 90 
1985 26081 28085 93 24664 28099 88 
1990 41413 46469 89 36886 43325 85 
1995 67828 75077 90 58248 66901 87 
2002 77968 95434 81 72734 85145 81 
Sources: EU Court of Auditors Annual Reports and European Commission Budgets Directorate 
General Annual Reports on Allocated Expenditure, Various Years. 
Note: *Common unit of account, this being the € from 1999. 
 
Because our analysis focuses on member states’ shares of EU budget transfers, 
we are most concerned with transfers to/from individual member states. We show 
these in Table 2. The net transfer is shown as a negative for net contributors to the EU 
budget and a positive for net recipients. Whilst some countries have long been net 
contributors, changes on both sides of the budget have led to the situation where, of 
the EU15, only the four Cohesion Countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) 
remain as net beneficiaries. 
In Tables 3 and 4 we present some simple statistics indicating the stability of 
EU budgetary transfers, using the means and coefficients of variation (CoV – standard 
deviation as a percentage of the mean) for member states’ percentage shares of EU 
Budget transfers. As a simple measure of stability, we consider whether an individual 
sub-period mean spending share lies outside the full-period mean plus or minus one 
full-period standard deviation. In Table 3 we consider EU Budget revenues, where we 
disaggregate the full period first by EU enlargements (in 1981, 1986 and 1995) and 
second around 1988, when the EU agreed significant reforms to the budget process. 
The general picture is one of stability of own resource shares, despite changes 
in the structure of own resources over time. Using our simple stability measure, there 
are nine outliers, although three observations are for the initial, transitional, period of 
new member states’ membership, whilst the two for Luxembourg may simply be a 
small-number problem with the statistics. A comparison of the CoV data before and 
after the 1988 reform shows that for almost all countries the CoV fell. This is 
expected, a priori, because revenues from import tariffs fell (these varying with, inter 
alia, exchange rates and agricultural production), replaced with revenue from VAT 
and, increasingly, GNP, revenue sources that evolve much more slowly over time.5 
 
 
                                                        
5 Similar analyses for own resource contributions by type, in aggregate and disaggregated by source 
country (not reproduced here), confirm the picture of stability of member states’ shares. There are, 
however, slightly more individual outliers, suggesting some smoothing across own resources. 
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Table 2 EU Budgetary Transfers by Member State, selected years, € million 
 OR exp net OR exp net OR exp net OR exp net OR exp net 
 Bel   Dk   D   El   E   
1976 498 386 -112 159 397 238 2108 1088 -1020       
1980 951 677 -273 346 680 334 4610 2940 -1670       
1985 1293 1070 -223 620 913 292 7504 4185 -3319 388 1703 1315    
1990 1764 990 -774 775 1198 423 10357 4807 -5550 564 3034 2470 3671 5383 1711 
1995 2680 2369 -311 1295 1601 306 21324 7893 -13431 985 4474 3489 3645 10863 7218 
2002 3018 1992 -1026 1688 1427 -261 17582 11532 -6050 1338 4673 3335 6551 15175 8624 
 F   Ire   It   Lux   NL   
1976 1652 1548 -104 39 228 189 1317 1147 -170 12 9 -3 675 781 106 
1980 2992 3372 380 139 827 687 1929 2611 681 20 15 -5 1273 1667 395 
1985 5319 5416 97 296 1549 1252 3630 4480 851 51 9 -42 1889 2232 343 
1990 8089 6285 -1805 368 2261 1892 6098 5681 -417 75 15 -60 2615 2984 368 
1995 11877 10150 -1727 665 2552 1887 6414 5800 -614 168 123 -45 4350 2345 -2005 
2002 14152 11771 -2381 1019 2563 1544 11279 8113 -3166 184 135 -49 4468 1539 -2929 
 Pt   UK   Aut   Fin   Swe   
1976    1250 994 -256          
1980    3168 1803 -1365          
1985    5090 3107 -1983          
1990 503 1103 601 6534 3148 -3387          
1995 865 3246 2381 9252 4531 -4720 1763 858 -905 888 723 -165 1658 721 -937 
2002 1187 3857 2669 10153 6021 -4132 1809 1537 -272 1185 1178 -7 2086 1222 -864 
Sources: See Table 1 
Notes: OR – own resources; exp – expenditures; net – expenditures-own resources. 
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Table 4 repeats the analysis for expenditures, except that the second 
disaggregation of data (in addition to the one by EU enlargement) splits the data in 
1993, from which date the 1992 CAP reform was implemented. The results indicate 
some variability in the early years, but much greater stability subsequently – even 
with successive enlargements. Again, this is expected a priori. First, NCE has risen as 
a share of total EU spending. Second, the CAP (the largest spending policy), saw 
much price support spending replaced with (the more stable) direct payments after 
1992. Table 5, focusing exclusively on CAP spending, confirms this. 
Note that of eleven outliers, three each occur for Italy and the Netherlands, 
both of whom see spending shares decline substantially over time. A more 
disaggregated analysis of CAP spending, not presented here, indicates that Italy 
experiences a general decline in CAP receipts, but with no obvious cause. With the 
Netherlands, however, the fall in total CAP receipts arises principally from the 1984 
reform of the dairy sector. As a result, their receipts by the late 1990s were about €1.5 
billion per year lower than a decade earlier – from this sector alone. 
Of particular interest are the figures for France and Ireland. Not only do these 
countries gain considerably from the CAP (France in total terms, Ireland in per capita 
terms) but Table 5 indicates they have managed to achieve a greater stability of 
spending shares over time. Indeed, they are the only countries for which the CoV 
declines in each sub-period prior to the 1992 CAP reform.6 Table 5 shows that even if 
we halve the width of the band by which we define outliers, still neither country has a 
single outlier. This stability of shares of CAP spending, it should be reiterated, has 
been achieved even as the EU has expanded. 
 
Table 3 Percentage Shares of Total Own Resources by Member State (means and 
coefficients of variation) 
Means Bel Dk D El E F Ire It Lux NL Pt UK Aut Fin Swe 
1973-
1980 6.6* 1.9 28.4   21.2 0.6* 15.8 0.1* 9.0*  16.2    
1981-
1985 5.2 2.1 28.1 1.5  19.7 1.1 13.3 0.2 7.0  21.8*    
1986-
1994 4.3 2.1 28.2 1.4 7.5 19.9 0.9 14.8 0.2 6.5 1.2 13.0    
1995-
2002 3.9 2.0 26.4 1.6 7.2 17.3* 1.2 12.6 0.2* 6.3 1.4 13.0 2.5 1.4 2.8 
1973-
1988 5.8 2.1 28.1 1.4 6.1* 20.8 0.8 14.7 0.2 7.9 0.9* 17.7    
1989-
2002 4.0 2.0 27.4 1.5 7.6 18.1 1.0 13.7 0.2 6.3 1.4 12.7 2.5 1.4 2.8 
1973-
2002 5.0 2.0 27.8 1.5 7.4 19.5 0.9 14.3 0.2 7.2 1.3 15.3 2.5 1.4 2.8 
CoV                
1973-
1980 6.6 24.3 4.7   11.5 38.0 17.3 16.2 5.8  28.6    
1981-
1985 4.8 8.8 2.5 13.7  2.3 11.9 7.1 16.1 2.9  7.6    
1986-
1994 7.3 11.1 9.7 20.6 17.2 6.2 9.0 10.7 15.3 4.0 26.7 19.4    
                                                        
6 See Ackrill (forthcoming, 2005) for a full discussion of these and related results. We do not repeat 
this analysis for Regional Policy spending because of difficulties involved in creating a consistent data 
series, given the evolution of the policy and consequent changes in data provision and presentation. 
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1995-
2002 4.6 5.7 11.1 5.4 13.6 3.6 16.9 12.8 13.3 4.8 7.8 15.4 5.9 5.5 7.1 
1973-
1988 16.1 18.1 4.2 23.3 18.1 8.9 36.5 15.6 18.5 14.5 8.4 25.3    
1989-
2002 5.3 5.4 11.5 8.9 12.7 6.4 20.4 15.3 16.3 4.2 14.1 17.7 5.9 5.5 7.1 
1973-
2002 22.8 13.9 8.3 15.1 15.4 10.4 31.2 15.6 23.9 16.4 19.8 28.4 5.9 5.5 7.1 
Bands                
± one 
s.d.                
upper 6.1 2.3 30.1 1.7 8.5 21.6 1.2 16.5 0.2 8.4 1.6 19.7 2.7 1.5 3.0 
lower 3.8 1.7 25.4 1.3 6.2 17.5 0.6 12.0 0.2 6.0 1.1 11.0 2.4 1.3 2.6 
Sources: Court of Auditors Annual Reports and Annual Reports on Allocated Operating 
Expenditure; own calculations. 
Note: * - outlier, as defined in the text. The outliers are determined by reference to the exact 
values of the numbers. In rounding to one decimal place some outliers may not, in this table, 
appear so to be. 
 
 
Table 4 Percentage Shares of Total Spending by Member State (means and 
coefficients of variation) 
Means Bel Dk D El E F Ire It Lux NL Pt UK Aut Fin Swe 
1976-
1980 5.8* 5.6* 20.2*   20.5 4.8 17.2 0.1 11.4*  14.4    
1981-
1985 3.7 3.7 16.3 5.4*  20.2 5.1 18.7* 0.0 8.7  18.1*    
1986-
1994 3.7 3.2 14.1 7.5 12.0 18.6 5.0 15.1 0.3 7.6 3.8 9.2    
1995-
2002 2.8 2.2 14.4 7.6 17.7 17.1 4.1 12.0* 0.2 2.9* 5.2 9.0 1.9 1.5 1.6 
1976-
1992 4.2 4.1 16.6 6.3 11.3 19.7 5.0 17.1 0.1 9.4 3.2 13.4    
1993-
2002 3.2 2.3 14.2 7.9 17.0 17.3 4.2 12.1* 0.3 3.3* 5.3 8.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 
1976-
2002 3.8 3.4 15.7 7.0 14.7 18.8 4.7 15.2 0.2 7.1 4.4 11.7 1.9 1.5 1.6 
CoV                
1976-
1980 12.1 10.1 16.8   15.4 23.2 7.4 37.2 5.2  19.8    
1981-
1985 10.1 8.3 8.5 31.1  9.4 13.1 6.7 29.3 3.3  19.7    
1986-
1994 31.9 16.0 8.4 17.6 26.3 10.6 12.0 15.1 108.1 34.5 43.8 11.9    
1995-
2002 18.7 12.0 5.0 8.1 11.9 4.2 12.7 11.7 18.5 21.4 10.2 11.1 14.2 14.0 11.5 
1976-
1992 32.0 27.0 19.2 24.7 28.8 12.5 15.5 10.0 130.7 21.2 43.2 33.8    
1993-
2002 26.7 14.7 6.2 10.4 13.4 5.0 13.5 14.6 87.5 27.6 10.2 11.3 14.2 14.0 11.5 
1976-
2002 33.3 36.4 17.9 20.9 26.8 12.3 17.0 19.6 112.5 48.3 31.9 35.9 14.2 14.0 11.5 
Bands                
± one s.d.                
upper 5.1 4.7 18.6 8.5 18.6 21.1 5.5 18.2 0.4 10.6 5.9 16.0 2.2 1.7 1.8 
lower 2.5 2.2 12.9 5.6 10.7 16.5 3.9 12.2 0.0 3.7 3.0 7.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 
Sources and Note: See Table 3. 
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Table 5: Percentage Shares of CAP Guarantee Spending by Member State 
(means and coefficients of variation) 
mean Bel Dk D El E F Ire It Lux NL Pt UK Aut Fin Swe 
1976-
1980 6.1* 6.3* 20.6*   21.8 4.6 16.0 0.2* 12.7*  11.7+    
1981-
1985 4.2 4.5 18.2 4.9*  23.3 4.5 19.2* 0.0+ 10.8+  10.4    
1986-
1994 3.6 4.2 16.2 6.9 8.2+ 22.3 4.7 15.4 0.0+ 9.8 1.0+ 7.7+    
1995-
2002 2.7+ 3.2* 14.8+ 6.6 13.0+ 23.2 4.2 11.8* 0.1 3.7* 1.8+ 9.8 2.2 1.5 1.7 
1976-
1992 4.5 4.9+ 18.2 5.9 6.9+ 22.3 4.7 17.1+ 0.1 11.4+ 0.8* 9.6    
1993-
2002 2.9+ 3.3+ 14.8+ 6.9 12.9+ 23.3 4.3 11.8* 0.1 4.2* 1.8+ 9.5 2.2 1.5 1.7 
1976-
2002 3.9 4.3 16.9 6.3 10.4 22.7 4.5 15.1 0.1 8.7 1.3 9.6 2.2 1.5 1.7 
CoV                
1976-
1980 12.7 9.1 17.6   18.2 26.4 14.1 39.1 7.3  29.8    
1981-
1985 9.2 5.3 6.2 41.7  12.1 18.9 8.7 27.3 3.8  7.4    
1986-
1994 22.1 9.3 10.7 14.9 50.9 9.7 15.7 15.6 76.6 32.7 59.1 9.6    
1995-
2002 31.3 13.7 4.8 5.6 11.1 4.1 8.4 10.0 26.2 25.9 11.4 9.2 38.7 38.4 35.7 
1976-
1992 28.6 19.9 15.3 28.1 54.9 13.0 19.7 12.7 126.4 17.8 49.9 27.2    
1993-
2002 29.3 14.4 4.9 9.9 10.1 3.8 8.1 11.3 36.1 32.7 14.0 10.8 38.7 38.4 35.7 
1976-
2002 35.5 26.3 16.5 21.7 38.0 10.5 16.9 21.0 103.9 45.3 43.7 22.4 38.7 38.4 35.7 
Bands                
+/- one 
s.d.                
upper 5.3 5.5 19.7 7.7 14.4 25.0 5.3 18.3 0.1 12.7 1.9 11.7 3.0 2.0 2.2 
lower 2.5 3.2 14.1 5.0 6.5 20.3 3.8 11.9 0.0 4.8 0.8 7.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 
+/- 0.5 
s.d.                
upper 4.6 4.9 18.3 7.0 12.4 23.8 4.9 16.7 0.1 10.7 1.6 10.6 2.6 1.8 1.9 
lower 3.2 3.8 15.5 5.6 8.5 21.5 4.1 13.5 0.0 6.8 1.1 8.5 1.7 1.2 1.4 
Sources and Note: See Table 3 and Ackrill (2005, forthcoming). Also, *=outliers greater 
than the full-period mean +/- one full period standard deviation, +=outliers greater than +/- 
one-half of the full period standard deviation. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis in this section has demonstrated that member 
states’ shares of transfers to and from the EU Budget have been stable over time, for 
some countries even as the EU has enlarged. The EU’s decision-making processes, 
the nature of Non-Compulsory Expenditures and recent CAP reforms have all played 
a role in this. Crucially, for the EU Budget generally and the CAP in particular, the 
greatest budgetary power has remained with the member states, through the Council 
of Ministers.7 Given collective decision-making in a zero-sum budget game, countries 
cannot all achieve maximum returns from the EU budget. For a given distribution of 
budget spending ab initio, however, they are able to take decisions that preserve 
                                                        
7 Recently through the European Council as well. 
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spending shares. What, though, does all this imply for the NMS and Romania? These 
questions are dealt with in the next two sections. 
 
4. THE BUDGET OUTCOME FOR THE NEW MEMBER STATES 
 
We begin this section by looking at the amounts laid down for spending in the 
NMS. These were first set out in the Financial Perspective agreed in 1999. The 
presentation of the tables by the EU is complicated by mixing payment appropriations 
(sums available for spending in any particular year) with commitment appropriations 
(sums available for spending in the current year plus agreed future spending on multi-
annual projects). Table 6 shows elements of the Financial Perspective. Parts A and B 
present spending in the EU15 and EU21 as agreed in 1999 (when only six new 
member states were expected to join – and in 2002). Part C shows the revised Budget 
from May 2003, for an EU25 with enlargement in 2004. From Table 6, some 




The sums assigned for assistance prior to joining the EU remain unchanged 
between the 1999 agreement (Parts A/B) and the 2003 revision (Part C) – €3.12 
billion each year. Since the 1999 figures assumed an accession of six countries, this 
implies more money is now available for Romania, given that as of May 2003 the list 
of post-2004 applicants was three (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey), not seven. 
 
Total Spending From 2004 in an Enlarged EU 
 
Even though the 2004 enlargement brought in four more countries than was 
planned for in the 1999 Financial Perspective, total EU spending from 2004, as set out 
in the revised 2003 Financial perspective, remained unaltered.8 This is a key point that 
we shall return to later. 
 
                                                        
8 The EU tends to use the terms ‘Payment Appropriations’ and ‘Appropriations for Payment’ 
interchangeably. 
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Table 6: Selected Elements of the Financial Perspective, 2000-2006, €mn, 1999 
prices (commitment appropriations unless otherwise stated) 
Part A: EU15 (Berlin Summit Agreement, March 1999) 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 40920 42800 43900 43770 42760 41930 41660 
- CAP guarantees 36620 38480 39570 39430 38410 37570 37290 
- rural development, other measures 4300 4320 4330 4340 4350 4360 4370 
Structural Operations 32045 31455 30865 30285 29595 29595 29170 
Pre-Accession Aid 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 
- Agriculture 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
- pre-accession structural instruments 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
- PHARE (applicant countries) 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 
Total Commitment Appropriations 92025 93475 93955 93215 91735 91125 90660 
Total Payment Appropriations 89600 91110 94220 94880 91910 90160 89620 
Available for Accession (Payment 
Approp’ns)   4140 6710 8890 11440 14220 
- Agriculture   1600 2030 2450 2930 3400 
- Other Expenditure   2540 4680 6440 8510 10820 
Ceiling on Payment Appropriations 89600 91110 98360 101590 100800 101600 103840 
- as %GNP 1.13 1.12 1.18 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.13 
Part B: EU21, 2002 Accession (Berlin Summit Agreement, March 1999) 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 40920 42800 43900 43770 42760 41930 41660 
- CAP guarantees 36620 38480 39570 39430 38410 37570 37290 
- rural development, other measures 4300 4320 4330 4340 4350 4360 4370 
Structural Operations 32045 31455 30865 30285 29595 29595 29170 
Pre-Accession Aid 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 
- Agriculture 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
- pre-accession structural instruments 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
- PHARE (applicant countries) 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 
Enlargement   6450 9030 11610 14200 16780 
- Agriculture   1600 2030 2450 2930 3400 
- Structural Operations   3750 5830 7920 10000 12080 
- Internal Policies   730 760 790 820 850 
- Administration   370 410 450 450 450 
Total Commitment Appropriations 92025 93475 100405 102245 103345 105325 107440 
Total Payment Appropriations 89600 91110 98360 101590 100800 101600 103840 
- of which, enlargement   4140 6710 8890 11440 14220 
Part C: EU25, 2004 Accession (Agreed May 2003) 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 40920 42800 43900 43770 44657 45677 45807 
- CAP guarantees 36620 38480 39570 39430 38737 39602 39612 
- rural development, other measures 4300 4320 4330 4340 5920 6075 6195 
Structural Operations 32045 31455 30865 30285 35665 36502 37940 
Pre-Accession Aid 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 
- Agriculture 520 520 520 520    
- pre-accession structural instruments 1040 1040 1040 1040    
- PHARE (applicant countries) 1560 1560 1560 1560    
Compensation     1273 1173 940 
Total Appropriations for 
Commitments 92025 93475 93955 93215 102985 105128 106741 
Total Appropriations for Payment 89600 91110 94220 94880 100800 101600 103840 
Ceiling, Appropriations for Payment, 
%GNI 1.07 1.08 1.11 1.1 1.08 1.06 1.06 
Sources: Parts A and B – “European Parliament, Council, Commission. Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure”. Official Journal of the 
European Communities C172, 18.6.1999, pp. 1-22. Part C – “Decision of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 May 2003 on the adjustment of the Financial Perspective for Enlargement.” 
Official Journal of the European Communities L147, 14.6.2003, pp. 25-30. 
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The Allocation of Spending, by Policy, in the New Member States 
 
Given the refusal of the EU15 to raise total spending for an expanded 
enlargement, we look now to see if any change was agreed to the distribution of 




At the 1999 Berlin Summit, as well as agreeing the Financial Perspective 
summarised in Parts A and B of Table 6, a reform of the CAP was agreed, notionally 
to prepare it for enlargement within the spending limits. A major issue of contention 
emerged early on – would the EU extend to the NMS all instruments of CAP support, 
in particular direct payments? EU public statements showed indecision on this. Two 
of the most common arguments against extending direct payments were that such 
levels of transfer would inhibit farm re-structuring and that since these farmers did not 
face the original price cuts (accession would see many prices rise) there could be no 
logic in giving them compensation payments. 
Paradoxically this second argument was undermined by the 1999 CAP reform. 
The 1999 reform continued the 1992 process of reducing price support levels and 
raising direct payment levels, but in 1999 the rise in direct payments only covered 
half the price cut. Further, all support instruments other than direct income support 
were grouped into a new Rural Development policy (or Pillar II of the CAP). 
Countries could then re-cycle some Guarantee (Pillar I) money into Pillar II policies. 
These changes weakened the direct link between price cuts and direct payments, the 
latter no longer being specific compensation for specific price cuts. 
Thus, after the 1999 reform, it was agreed that direct payments would be 
granted to farmers in the NMS. Indeed, negotiating accession on any other basis 
would have been impossible. The situation would have arisen that the CAP would be 
granting substantial aid to farmers in richer countries but not to farmers in poorer 
countries, whilst the latter would still be subject to many constraints under the CAP, 
notably production quotas and set aside. 
Crucial issues still had to be discussed, however, most notably how the 
payments would be made to the NMS but the Financial Perspective still respected. 
The eventual solution was to phase-in the direct payments over ten years. Starting at 
25%, they would be gradually increased until, in 2013, they would be made at 100% 
“of the levels then applicable” – a wording that leaves open the possibility of further 
reform between now and then.9 Some countries, notably Poland, had demanded an 
initial payment level of 40% and a shorter transition period, but ultimately the EU15 
position prevailed. 
The impact of this on projected CAP spending in the NMS is summarised in 
Table 7. Note that the revised 2003 Financial Perspective (as summarised in Part C of 
Table 6) does not break down Pillar II spending between Commitment and Payment 
Appropriations. Note also that the 1999 Financial Perspective shows the same sums 
projected for CAP (Pillar II) spending under both CA and PA. These data reveal some 
interesting developments. First, the phasing-in of direct payments has resulted in a re-
                                                        
9 The meaning of ‘25%’ and ‘100%’ needs clarifying. Actual payment levels vary between countries 
because of different historical yields. ‘25%’ does not refer to one-quarter of the value of the ‘EU15’ 
payment, because each country’s payment is different, but to one-quarter of the full (100%) value of 
each country’s payment, calculated using the EU–wide methodology. 
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scheduling of spending. The bottom line even suggests that Pillar II spending will be 
phased-in. Recall also that with accession occurring only on 1 May 2004, the 2004 
totals only cover eight months-worth of spending. In addition, compared with the 
1999 Financial Perspective, the 2003 agreement raised the sums to be spent on the 
CAP over 2004-2006. Payment Appropriations are increased by €526 million, with 
Commitment Appropriations raised by about €1 billion (within the unchanged overall 
limit for total PA). 
The decision to phase in CAP direct payments also requires us to comment 
upon the spending element ‘Compensation’ (near the bottom of Table 6). This 
decision created the unfortunate situation that some of the NMS will initially be net 
contributors to the EU Budget, given that they must make revenue contributions in 
full ab initio. As a result, the EU will pay compensation during the first three years of 
membership. Moreover, the figures finally agreed in May 2003 were €100 million 
higher than those originally approved at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, 
when the accession negotiations were concluded. What is interesting is that despite 
the modest sum involved, the money has been taken from planned structural spending 
in the NMS, an area of particular need in these rather poorer countries. 
 
Table 7 The Evolution of Planned CAP Spending in the New Member States, 
€mn, 1999 prices 
Item CA/PA/NDA 1999/2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Total Agriculture CA & PA 1999 2450 2930 3400 8780 
Total Agriculture CA 2003 1897 3747 4147 9791 
Total Agriculture PA 2003 911 3248 4095 8254 
CAP Guarantees NDA 2003 327 2032 2322 4681 
Rural Development CA 2003 1570 1715 1825 5110 
Rural Development PA 2003 584 1216 1773 3573 
Sources: Table 6; Disaggregated data for ‘CAP Guarantees’ and ‘Rural Development PA’, 
from the EU Budget Website: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/copenhagen_package/webtablesEN.pdf 
Notes: CA – Commitment Appropriations; PA – Payment Appropriations; NDA – Non-
Differentiated Appropriations. 
 
The foregoing discussion allows us to draw a number of conclusions that both 
illuminate the way in which the politics and processes of the EU Budget impacted on 
the accession negotiations and also help us understand the situation faced by 
Romania. The first point to note is that, as intended in 1988, the member states have 
shown a strong commitment to the spending limits set out in successive Financial 
Perspectives. The 2004 enlargement showed that total spending as laid down in the 
1999 Perspective was inviolable, even with a larger than planned accession. 
This increasingly effective budget discipline is widely seen as a positive 
development in the management of EU finances (see, inter alia, Ackrill 2000). The 
discussion in this paper, however, suggests problems as well. The EU15 have 
defended their spending shares, through the interaction of member states via policy 
reform negotiations. For non-compulsory expenditures the main element, Regional 
Policy, had seen spending rise significantly since 1988, in relative and absolute terms. 
This ended in 1999, with a limit on transfers to any member state set at 4% of its 
GDP. For the first time, EU regional policy had to adapt to spending limits, rather 
than enjoying ever-higher spending, agreed in pursuit of wider EU policy goals. The 
negotiations for the 2004 enlargement have advanced still further the financial 
constraints faced by structural spending. 
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In order to grant support to the NMS and keep total spending within overall 
limits, structural spending in the EU15 has come under threat. Spain in particular has 
vehemently opposed any reduction in its considerable financial advantage – currently 
about one third of EU structural spending and one-fifth of total EU spending. At least 
principles such as the 4% rule are common to all member states. The same cannot be 
said for the most expensive policy of all, the CAP. This policy has undergone huge 
change in the last decade, with the basis of support changed and Rural Development 
policies introduced, yet spending on the policy has fallen only as a percentage of total 
EU spending, not in absolute terms. Indeed, national co-financing of Pillar II 
measures mean the total cost of CAP policies has risen, albeit with the burden now 
shared between the EU and national budgets. 
For some countries, there was a wider agenda lying behind the wish to grant 
lower direct payments to the NMS. The UK and Sweden, for example, wanted to give 
the NMS less, not for discriminatory reasons but because they believed (mistakenly), 
that in order to maintain a Common Agricultural Policy, and ensure the EU25 
spending limit was respected, a reform would have to be agreed that saw lower 
payments to the EU15 also. The final agreement ultimately showed how far some 
countries were prepared to go to defend their spending shares – even willing to 
sacrifice commonality of support under the CAP, this supposed ‘cornerstone’ of 
European integration, to achieve this. Put cynically, the goals for fiscal discipline set 
by the EU15 in the 1999 Financial Perspective then had to be met by the NMS. 
A further feature of the final accession agreement was a deal whereby, for the 
first three years of membership, the NMS could use some of their Pillar II money to 
top-up direct income payments. The amount is, however, limited to 20% of Pillar II 
funds and must be co-funded by the member state. From 2007, all top-up money must 
come from national sources. This raises questions about the ability of the NMS to 
fund this, although see Hallet (2004) for a positive assessment of this particular issue. 
Given the political sensitivity of EU spending across the member states it 
came as no surprise when, in proposing further reforms for the CAP (agreed in 2003), 
Commissioner Fischler made specific reference to the impact of the reforms on the 
budget. Even though this reform was seen by many as the most radical ever (by 
aiming to break more fully than in 1992 the link between support received by farmers 
and current production levels), the proposals were drawn up merely “with a view to 
achieving the objective of stabilising agricultural expenditure in real terms” 
(European Commission, 2002: 29 – emphasis added). Furthermore, although funds 
can be re-cycled from Pillar I to Pillar II across the CAP as a whole, a minimum of 
80% of re-cycled money must remain in the ‘home’ country, minimising the 
redistribution of CAP funds between countries. It appears that, in order to stand a 
chance of getting agreement on CAP reform, the member states must first receive a 
guarantee that their budgetary gains from the policy will not be eroded by the reform. 
 
5. ROMANIA AND THE EU BUDGET: PROCESS AND OUTCOME 
 
The foregoing discussion raises a series of issues that can inform a considered 
assessment of Romania’s experiences with the EU Budget process. One point that can 
be made, given the foregoing discussion, is that whatever is agreed, Romania will find 
it extremely difficult subsequently to negotiate a higher budget share. Below, we 
estimate likely parameters within which a budget deal for Romania could lie, given 
the agreement reached with the three biggest NMS – the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. 
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The approach taken in this analysis is very simple and mechanistic. We justify 
this by arguing that a key consequence of the foregoing analysis is that the allocation 
of budget shares to NMS – and even to the EU15 – is based not so much on policy 
need as on securing a share of limited funds. This allocation is determined with 
reference to policy-related variables (rather than specific policy instruments), within 
tight process-driven restraints, especially the primacy of overall spending limits, 
expressed through the Financial Perspective. Moreover, we note not only the direct 
control exerted over Non-Compulsory Expenditures, but recent CAP reforms that 
have imposed comparable constraints on this largest Compulsory Expenditure as well. 
Thus we consider spending in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by reference 
to the relative values of various economic indicators. From this, we derive ‘high’ and 





We estimate a single figure, making no distinction between income support 
and Rural Development expenditures. We find that, in the NMS8, there is a very close 
correlation with the variable ‘utilised agricultural area’ (UAA) – except for Slovenia, 
for which special arrangements were agreed. This correlation is reasonable, a priori, 
on two grounds. First, the largest single element of income support is direct payments, 
in particular the area-based support for the arable sector. Second, given the low level 
of economic development and the need for support across the whole rural economy, 
total agricultural area would be a reasonable proxy for a country’s need for Rural 
Development assistance. We use 2001 data for UAA published by the European 
Commission and base our estimate of spending in Romania on projected CAP 
transfers and UAA data in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (NMS3) for 
2004-2006. We express UAA in Romania as a ratio relative to UAA in these three 
countries, then apply that ratio to planned CAP spending in the NMS3. This produces 
a series of estimates for CAP spending in Romania for 2007-2009, across which the 
range from highest to lowest is no more than about 10%, with a gap of 6% in 2009. 
 
Regional Policy (RP) 
 
Population shares prove to have a very close correlation with projected 
regional policy support spending in the NMS8, with the exception of the Czech 
Republic. Note that throughout the NMS, only the Prague region in the Czech 
Republic and Bratislava region in Slovakia are not classified as Objective 1. Overall, 
for most countries, total population is thus a reasonable proxy for RP spending 
eligibility (within which, Objective 1 spending is the largest single element). Given 
the Czech Republic is something of an outlier in this regard, we use the same 
approach as for CAP spending, but just consider data for Hungary and Poland for 
2004-2006. Our higher and lower estimates are again spread by no more than about 




We estimate the balance on total spending as total Payment Appropriations 
minus CAP spending minus regional policy spending, excluding the temporary 
compensation payments. We estimate ‘other spending’ as a residual rather than by 
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direct calculation because of the presence of tight budgetary constraints and an 
inflexible negotiation process. This means, for example, an increase in CAP spending 
will see ‘other’ spending fall in order to respect any explicit or notional spending 
limit. We then produce a matrix of estimates for possible spending in Romania, based 
on our earlier ‘high’ and ‘low’ estimates of CAP and RP spending. The results of this 
simple exercise are summarised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 Estimates of EU Spending in Romania, €million, Payment 
Appropriations 
Item Range 2007 2008 2009 
2007 (12 
mth) 
CAP high 348 1385 1680 522 
 low 317 1234 1579 476 
RP high 491 1014 1203 736 
 low 449 941 1125 674 
Other high 184 288 375 277 
 low 146 239 324 218 
Total high 1023 2686 3257 1535 
 low 912 2415 3029 1368 
Sources: European Commission website (see Table 7); agricultural area data from European 
Commission; population data from Eurostat; own calculations. 
 
These results are only indicative estimates, underpinned by a series of 
important assumptions. First and foremost, we have assumed the general basis upon 
which spending in the NMS8 has been determined will apply equally to Romania. For 
regional policy, our estimates are considerably below the 4% threshold for GDP 
(calculated using Eurostat GDP estimates for 2004 and 2005 and assuming the growth 
rate between these two years is sustained into the future). Regional policy spending 
may therefore be raised above the levels shown here. Our approach assumes the direct 
payments under the CAP are phased in according to the same schedule as in the new 
member states, thus the pattern for Romania in the period 2007 to 2009 mirrors that in 
the NMS from 2004 to 2006. The estimate of spending in 2007 is based on an eight-
month figure for 2004 spending in the NMS: the last column of Table 8 adjusts this 
figure for a full twelve months. Finally, the bottom line (literally) of Table 8 shows 
that annual gross transfers are going to be quite significant, possibly rising as high as 
4-5% of GDP, although the net transfer after own resource contributions will be about 




Membership of the European Union will bring much to Romania, both 
political and economic, hopefully mainly positive. In this paper we have looked at just 
one element – possible gains for Romania from the EU budget, but we have 
considered this from a particular point of view. We have argued that EU budgetary 
processes and constraints are such that member states’ shares of EU Budget transfers 
tend to be very stable. Recent accession negotiations, especially over the CAP, have 
shown the lengths the EU15 will go to, to defend their budget shares. For a new 
member state, this is important because it suggests not only that there is very little 
flexibility in the pre-accession budget negotiations, it also implies that once a 
member, a country will find it extremely difficult to negotiate higher transfers. Put 
crudely, what you get on entry is what you are then stuck with. 
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One of the main conclusions from the earlier sections of the paper, that 
justified our fairly simple approach to estimating possible budget transfers to 
Romania, was an increasingly mechanistic approach to the EU Budget and national 
budget shares. The evidence shows that the EU15 countries have successfully created 
and defended a certain pattern of budgetary transfers that enlargement, even one on 
the scale of 2004, will not be allowed to disrupt. Even the Common Agricultural 
Policy, described as a ‘cornerstone’ of European integration, is being implemented 
differentially in the EU15 and the NMS in order to ensure existing gains to the EU15 
are retained within the strict spending limit laid they down in the 1999 Financial 
Perspective. 
The transfers likely to be made available to Romania will be substantial. That 
said, given the extraordinary political sensitivity surrounding the EU budget and its 
distribution across the EU member states, each applicant has more or less been 
presented with a take-it-or-leave-it offer on budget transfers. Ever-diminishing 
flexibility in budgetary processes mean little scope for applicants to raise by any 
significant amount the sums on offer; nor is there much likelihood of countries raising 
their shares in future Financial Perspectives. Nominal amounts may go up, but 
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